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THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE:
SOVEREIGN SEAWAY
OR INTERNATIONAL STRAIT?
A REASSESSMENT OF THE LEGAL STATUS
GILLIAN MACNEIL†

ABSTRACT
The status of the Northwest Passage has been the subject of
disagreement for at least 30 years. The debate has gained new urgency
recently as evidence suggests that the warming trends associated with
climate change are causing a reduction in Arctic sea ice. The practical
consequence of those physical changes is that the formerly ice choked
waters of the Northwest Passage might become an attractive route to
commercial shippers as early as 2050.
The debate surrounding the status of the Passage is relatively narrow.
At issue is the degree of control which the coastal state, Canada,
has over the waters of the seaway. The Canadian position is that the
Northwest Passage forms part of its historical internal waters and, as
such, Canada has the right to exercise full sovereignty over the Passage.
These sovereign rights mean that Canada is the only country with the
automatic right to use the Passage. By contrast, potential user states,
including the United States, have argued that the Northwest Passage is
an international strait and that foreign ships enjoy navigational rights
in those waters.
The debate between the coastal states and potential user states has been
framed as a legal question and is therefore suited to a legal examination.
An analysis of the dispute, placing the positions of the parties against
customary law of the sea and the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, indicates that both arguments suffer
weaknesses.
†
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While the parties’ words indicate that they may be at potentially
irreconcilable odds, a review of state practice suggests the development
of an Arctic regime, which is responsive to the needs of the coastal state
and the requirements of user states, is currently underway.
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INTRODUCTION
The status of the waters of the Canadian Arctic in general, and the Northwest Passage in particular, is a matter which is again receiving attention
in  the  ﬁelds  of  international  relations  and  international  law.  At  issue  is  
the degree of control that Canada, the coastal state, is entitled to exert
over the waters off the northern mainland and island coasts. Driven by
the impact of climate change, which could result in the Passage being
used for commercial shipping in the near future, the changing physical reality is setting the needs of the coastal state against the requirements of potential user states who want access to the Passage to be as
unrestricted by laws as possible. Canada has claimed the Arctic waters,
including the Northwest Passage as part of its historical internal waters
but, this claim has been the subject of protest by other states. The most
signiﬁcant  party  to  the  dispute  with  Canada,  as  a  result  of  proximity  and  
power, is the United States. American leaders believe that their own security and sovereignty are best assured by the ability to freely navigate
their ships anywhere they might be required. As such, the United States
asserts that the Northwest Passage is an international strait subject to
a regime of transit rights. The dispute between Canada and the United
States is framed in legal terms and is thus subject to any uncertainties
which are found in international law.
This paper is an effort to assess the current Canadian and American
positions against the modern customary and conventional law of the sea,
and  demonstrates  that  there  are  difﬁculties  with  the  arguments  made  by  
both states. It will begin with an exploration of why the status of the
Arctic seems to be increasing in importance. This will be followed by
an exploration of the strength of the Canadian and the American legal
arguments on the status of the Arctic waters in general, and the special
situation of the Northwest Passage. As weaknesses are found in both
arguments, the analysis continues by looking at the current practice in
the Canadian Arctic, and asking whether a regime different from those
asserted by the parties is taking shape. This examination of current practice concludes that, rather than conforming to either of the two categories put forward by the parties, there is instead a unique Arctic regime
developing. As a judicial solution to the question of the Northwest Passage seems unlikely, the contours of this emerging Arctic regime, and
the  question  of  how  it  might  be  preserved,  are  addressed  in  the  ﬁnal  part  
of this essay.
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I. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF THE ARCTIC
The increased interest in the Northwest Passage over the last few years
is a direct result of the impact of climate change on the Arctic. Much
of the current interest in the Arctic arises from concerns about climate
change.1 Warming trends in the northern regions of North America, and
Northern and Central Asia exceed the global model by as much as 40%.2
However, some view the general warming of the Arctic and attendant
retreat of the polar ice pack as positive. In particular, the reduction of
the ice pack has sparked renewed interest in the Arctic as the locus of
potential shipping routes.3 In terms of the Canadian Arctic, one author
observed that, “‘[g]lobal warming’ suggests positive impacts for Canadian shipping[…]”4 A “viable” alternative to the Panama Canal would
be considered by some as a positive development for the shipping industry.5 In addition to commercial shipping, the general warming of the
Arctic has sparked renewed interest in exploring the area for energy
resources6 further increasing the likelihood of a rise in Arctic shipping.7
Essentially, the shift in the conditions of the Arctic due to climate change
is sparking positive economic interest in the region.
This renewed interest is provoking a sense that it is necessary to settle the status of the Northwest Passage. To date, there has been no real
need  to  make  a  ﬁnal  determination  of  rights  in  and  over  the  Northwest  
1

Douglas M. Johnston, “The Future of the Arctic Ocean: Competing Domains of
International Public Policy” (2003) 17 Ocean Y.Bk. 596 at 597.
2
Carl Anderson, “Global Warming and Canada’s Shipping Lanes: An
Oceanographer’s View” (2003) 17 Ocean Y.Bk. 563 at 575-576.
3
Lawson Brigham and Ben Ellis, eds., Arctic Marine Transport Workshop
(Anchorage: Northern Printing, 2004) 2 [Arctic Marine Transport Workshop]. Arctic
Marine  Transport,  online:    <http://www.arctic.gov/ﬁles/AMTW_book.pdf>.  
4
Anderson, supra, note 2 at 563.
5
Rob Annandale, “Clear Sailing in the North?” MacLean’s (October 3,
2005) MacLeans, online: <http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/canada/article.
jsp?content=20051003_113126_113126>
6
Paul Reynolds, “The Arctic’s new gold rush” BBC News (October 25, 2005), BBC,
online:  <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4354036.stm>.  Rob  Huebert,  “The  Law  
of  the  Sea  and  the  Arctic:  An  Unfulﬁlled  Legacy  “  
[An  Unfulﬁlled  Legacy]  (2004)  18  Ocean Y.Bk.  193  at  198.
7
Rob Huebert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest
Passage”  [Climate  Change]  (2004)  Isuma  86  at  88.
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Passage.8 In large part, the lack of urgency can be attributed to the fact
that the Northwest Passage has seen very little use largely due to the
heavy multi year ice which clogs the Passage and complicates navigation.9 Additionally, it is assumed that any challenge to the Canadian
position on the Northwest Passage will come from the United States.10
Since  1988,  the  Canada-United  States  relationship  over  the  Passage  has  
been governed by an Executive Agreement (the impact of which will
be examined below), which permits American icebreakers to transit the
Passage, provided Canada gives prior consent.11 The combination of
difﬁcult  navigation  and  an  Executive  Agreement  means  that  neither  the  
United States nor Canada has an incentive to reopen the debate.12 As
long as commercial transits of the Northwest Passage are unlikely, the
disagreement is allowed to remain, as one commentator characterized it,
“politely dormant.”13
However, the general warming trends have already begun to have
an impact on shipping in the waters off Canada’s north and surrounding
the Arctic Archipelago. This makes it impossible to ignore the contested
status  of  the  Passage  any  longer.  In  the  2000,  ﬁve  ships  arrived  a  week  
early in Iqaluit in order to have a chance at navigating the Passage and
the Canadian Coast Guard was providing escort services into the second
week of November, two weeks later than usual.14  It  is  difﬁcult  to  obtain  
precise information on ice conditions in the Northwest Passage the Canadian Ice Service does admit that the amount of ice in the Canadian
Arctic is declining, and predicts that there could be ice free summers

8  

Ibid 90.
Humphrey Melling, “Sea Ice of the Northern Canadian Arctic Archipelago” (2002)
107 Journal of Geophysical Research 2 at 2-1. Journal of Geophysical Research,
online:  <http://www.agu.org/journals/jc/jc0211/2001JC001101/2001JC001101.pdf>,  
Huebert,  “An  Unfulﬁlled  Legacy”  supra, note 6 at 203.
10
Rob Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty is
on  Thinning  Ice”  [The  Shipping  News  Part  II]  (2003)  58  Int’l  J.  295  at  305.
11
  Can.  T.S.  1988  No.  29.
12
Huebert, “Climate Change” supra, note 7 at 91.
13
Alanna Mitchell, “The Northwest Passage Thawed” The Globe and Mail
(February 5, 2000) A9. Globe and Mail, online: <http://www.carc.org/whatsnew/
writings/amitchell.html>  at  5.
14
Ibid 4.
9
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as early as 2050.15 For example the model used for the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment was described as being “too coarse” to be applicable
to the rather narrow straits and passages which make up the Northwest
Passage.16  In  spite  of  this,  ofﬁcials  have  stated  that  the  possibility  of  ice-
free seasons in 20-30 years has yet to spark any commercial interest. As
such, they are focused on developing shipping in the Canadian Arctic
to meet regional needs, and not to promote the Northwest Passage as a
potential alternative to the Panama Canal.17
This narrow focus on developing the Passage for regional use, and
taking no steps to encourage or facilitate large scale commercial use of
the Northwest Passage, can be seen as a logical extension of the Canadian position that the waters of the Passage are internal. If the waters of
the Northwest Passage are internal, then Canada, as the coastal state, is
the only country with automatic rights to navigate the Northwest Passage.  The  difﬁculty  is  that  the  melting  brought  about  by  climate  change,  
and the renewed interest in commercial use of the Passage, is raising
the possibility of serious new challenges to Canada’s position that the
Arctic waters between the Canadian mainland and the northern edge of
the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are internal.18 This clash of asserted
rights, combined with the likely challenge by user states, is injecting a
sense of urgency into discussions of the Northwest Passage. As a result
of  the  potential  of  this  challenge,  it  is  necessary  to  deﬁne  and  assess  the  
positions of the disputing parties and to determine whether those positions are supportable when the law (contained in both customary law
and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS))
is applied to the geographic and historic conditions of the area.

15

Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra, note 3 at 5.
Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra, note 3 at A-27.
17
Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, supra, note 3 at 5. It should be noted that this
statement is at odds with an assessment of interest made in 2000 by André Maillet,
currently the superintendent of the Canadian Coast Guard’s ice operations, maritime
region, who stated that industry was picking up quickly on the possibility of using
the Northwest Passage, Mitchell supra, note 13 at 4-5.
18  
In general see; Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde, “Our Arctic Sovereignty is
on Thin Ice” The Globe and Mail (August 1st, 2005) Globe and Mail, online: <http:/
www.arcticnet-ulaval.ca/index.php?fa=News.showNews&home=4menu=55&sub=1
&id=77>  [Arcticnet].
16
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II. THE CANADIAN CLAIM: AN OVERVIEW
The Canadian position on the Northwest Passage is subsumed by a larger
claim to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago
in general. The Canadian position was most clearly stated by then Secretary  of  State,  Joe  Clark  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  1985.  He  asserted  
that the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago were historical internal waters.19 In order to strengthen that claim, Joe Clark announced the
establishment of a series of straight baselines which would take effect
on January 1st,  1986.20 These would enclose the waters of the Canadian
Arctic,  reinforcing  the  Canadian  claim.  Since  1985,  the  Department  of  
Foreign Affairs has not issued any new statements on the Canadian position and,21  there  have  been  no  ofﬁcial  statements  which  contradict  the  
1985  assertion  that  the  waters  are  historical  internal  waters.  To  the  contrary,  various  statements  made  recently  have  served  to  conﬁrm  that  the  
view  of  Canadian  ofﬁcials  remains  unchanged.
In 2000, a document entitled The Northern Dimension of Canada’s
Foreign Policy, established Canada’s goals regarding the North. The
ﬁrst  two  objectives  articulated  in  this  paper  were:  
1. To enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially
northerners and Aboriginal peoples;
2. To assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty in
the North.

More recently, the Defence section of Canada’s International Policy
Statement asserted that a key aspect of domestic defence by the Canadian Forces will be to, “increase their efforts to ensure the sovereignty
and security of our territory, airspace and maritime approaches, including the Arctic.”22 This statement was supported by positive action when
the Department of National Defence announced the commencement of
Project Polar Epsilon on June 2, 2005. Project Polar Epsilon is a, “Joint
19

House of Commons Debates,  (September  10,  1985)  at  6463  (Hon.  Joe  Clark).
  S.O.R./85-872.
21
Huebert, “Climate Change” supra  note  7  at  88.
22
Department of National Defence, A  Role  of  Pride  and  Inﬂuence  in  the  World:  
Defence (Ottawa, 2005) 17. DND, online: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/dps/
pdf/dps_e.pdf>.
20
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Space-Based wide area surveillance and support capability that will
provide all-weather, day/night observation of Canada’s Arctic region
and its ocean approaches.”23 The project will use data obtained from the
satellite, Radarsat-II, which is scheduled for launch in 2006.24
The contention that the waters of the Arctic are subject to Canadian
sovereignty has also come from sources outside the federal government.
A discussion paper developed by the governments of Canada’s Northern
territories state that those three governments, “share […] objectives with
respect to sovereignty and security in the North: (1) Building northern
capacity to enhance Canada’s ability to assert its sovereignty in the Arctic.”25
Military  ofﬁcials  have  also  made  strong  statements  regarding  Canadian Arctic sovereignty. During a 2005 sovereignty exercise in the Arctic, Commodore Bob Blakely of the Royal Canadian Navy stated that:
This is a demonstration of Canada’s will to exercise sovereignty
over our own back yard […].The sea is a highway that’s open to
everyone. We will allow everybody passage as long as they ask for
our consent and comply with our rules: ‘use our resources wisely
and don’t pollute the fragile northern ecosystem. 26

After an episode in 2000 where a submarine was spotted in the Cumberland Sound, Colonel LeBlanc, Canada’s military commander in Yellowknife, stated that the act was a violation of Canadian sovereignty
which could have been taken as a covert operation of war and, had his

23

Department of National Defence News Release, “Project Polar Epsilon Will
Enhance Canada’s Surveillance and Security Capability” (June 2, 2005) DND,
online:    <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1674>.
24
Kristina Davis, “Project Polar Epsilon: Canada’s security and surveillance
enhancement” (July 13, 2005) DND, online: <http:www.forces.gc.ca/site/
community/mapleleaf/vol_8/vol8_26/826_07.pdf>.
25
Governments of Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, Developing a New
Framework for Sovereignty and Security in the North (2005) at 2. Government
of  Yukon,  NWT  and  Nunavut,  online:  <http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/2005/ﬁles/
sovereignty_and_security_in_the_north.pdf>
26
  Francis  Harris,  “Canada  ﬂexes  its  muscles  in  dispute  over  Arctic  Wastes”  Daily
Telegraph (August 22, 2005) Daily Telegraph, online: <http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/08/22/wcan22&sSheet=/news/2005/08/22/
ixworld.html>.  
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soldiers spotted the submarine, they would have forced it to the surface
or, possibly, attacked it.27
In 2004, the Canadian Executive, including Head of the Canadian
Government  and  the  Head  of  State,  conﬁrmed  Canadian  claims  to  sovereignty. During a visit to Nunavut, former Prime Minister Martin made
comments regarding Canadian Arctic sovereignty.28 This was followed
by the promise during the October 2004 Speech from the Throne to
create a comprehensive Northern Strategy in partnership with, “territorial partners, Aboriginal people and other northern residents.” Part the
strategy is to “protect the northern environment and Canada’s sovereignty and security…”29 Finally, in reply to the Speech from the Throne,
former Prime Minister Martin in the House of Commons stated:
Let me speak here of a region of particular challenge and remarkable
opportunity, our far north…The North is a land of mystic grandeur,
of mountains rising through the clouds, of valleys carved deep by
glaciers, of icebergs shaped by wind and wave. […] As a government,
we will work with the territories, their governments and aboriginal
groups to further develop the economy of the north. We will do so
in   a   way   that   will   sustain   the   environment   and   beneﬁt   the   people  
[…]. Let there be no doubt, we will protect Canada’s sovereignty
in the Arctic.30

The survey indicates is that, from the highest levels of the federal
government through territorial leaders, to military leaders, Canadians in
positions of power today consider the waters of the Arctic Archipelago
to be subject to full Canadian sovereignty, or to use the legal term, internal waters.31
27

Mitchell supra note 13 at 6.
Arcticnet, supra,  note  18.  Canadian  Press,  “Martin  Reafﬁrms  Canada’s
Sovereignty over North” CTV News (Aug. 11, 2004) CTV, online: <http://www.
ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20040811/Martin_North_040811?s_
name=&no_ads=>  [Canadian  Press].
29
House of Commons Debates, 002 (October 5, 2004) at 9 (Rt. Hon. Adrienne
Clarkson).
30
House of Commons Debates, 003 (October 6, 2004) at 45 (Hon. Paul Martin).
31
As will be discussed in the text, at customary law, internal waters were subject to
the full sovereignty of a state. It is to this which Canada refers in its claims over the
Arctic  waters.  Article  8  of  UNCLOS  also  uses  the  term  “internal  waters”  to  describe  
the waters enclosed by straight baselines however, the legal rights over such waters,
28  
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However, these more recent assertions of sovereignty can be viewed
as problematic. All the statements assert Canadian sovereignty over the
Arctic but none reiterate that the basis of that sovereignty is historic
title,  nor  are  the  words  “internal  waters”  speciﬁcally  used.  Does  this  indicate an alteration in the Canadian position? Since the establishment of
straight baselines around the Arctic had the effect of making the waters
internal regardless of any previous status,32 the question must be asked:
are subsequent assertions to sovereignty based on historic title, or do
they only refer to the effect of the baselines on the status of the waters?
This   question   is   important,   as  Article   8(2)   of   UNCLOS   provides   that  
where waters are made internal by means of baselines, a right of innocent passage exists. Otherwise, according to Article 2 of UNCLOS,
internal waters are considered to be part of the sovereign territory of
a state, and are thus subject to the full range of jurisdictional powers
which a state may exercise on its land territory. It is submitted that, regardless of the failure to re-articulate the basis of the Canadian claims,
there has been no change in the Canadian position.

III. RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENCIES
Since  at  least  1985,  it  has  been  understood  that  Canada  views  the  waters  
of the Arctic Archipelago as internal waters and that historic title is the
basis of that claim. Given Clark’s statement of sovereignty in the House
of Commons, any subsequent statement should be viewed as merely
an  afﬁrmation  of  that  position.  As  long  as  it  is  understood  that  Canada  
claims the waters as internal and that the claim is made on the grounds
of  historic  title,  there  should  be  no  need  to  reafﬁrm  that  the  waters  are  
internal as well as sovereign, or that the claim is based on historic title
with every renewed statement of sovereignty. One would only expect
reference to the status of the waters as internal, or the grounds support-

as will be seen, are only those rights which may be exercised over the territorial sea
of a state.
32
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep.
116. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  (UNCLOS),  1833  U.N.T.S.  
3,  art.  8.  UNCLOS,  online:  <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreememts/
convention_overview_convention.htm>.
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ing those statements of sovereignty, if the position of Canadian leaders
had changed.
Given the lack of statements regarding any alteration of the Canadian position, and the fact that recent assertions of Canadian sovereignty
have  come  from  high  level  ofﬁcials  who  could  make  authoritative  statements regarding changes to the Canadian claims, it is logical to conclude  that  the  Canadian  position  has  not  altered  since  1985.  Further  supporting this conclusion is the use of the word “sovereignty.” If Canadian
claims were based simply on a legal reality resulting from baselines, one
would expect the claim made to be that Canada enjoys Arctic “jurisdiction” or “authority.” “Sovereignty” is a far stronger term and indicates a
more possessive and personal claim. In short, Canada views the waters
of the Arctic Archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, as internal
waters by reason of historic title.
A second problem which may arise from the more recent statements
of sovereignty needs to be addressed. Some of those statements, for
instance the Speech from the Throne;33 do not refer to the waters of
the  Arctic   speciﬁcally,   only   to  Arctic   sovereignty   generally.   Or,   more  
problematically, in one of former Prime Minister Martin’s statements,
speciﬁc  reference  is  made  to  the  land,  and  not  the  waters.34 Does this
lack  of  speciﬁc  reference  to  Arctic  waters  represent  an  abandonment  of  
claims to Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic waters in general and the
Northwest Passage in particular? The answer to this question is no.
The dispute over rights in the Northwest Passage is part of a larger
challenge to Canadian Arctic sovereignty. It is widely known that Canada
claims sovereign rights over the Passage.35 It is also widely known that
Canada is party to other disputes regarding Arctic territory; for example are the dispute with Denmark over which nation has claim to Hans
Island, the dispute with the United States over the boundary delimitation of the Beaufort Sea and the Continental Shelf delimitation of the
Arctic, which involves Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia (among
others).36 Each of these disputes represents a threat to Canadian Arctic
33

Supra note 29.
Canadian Press, supra  note  28.
35
For articles providing evidence of this notoriety see Francis Harris, supra note 26
and Paul Reynolds, supra note 6.
36
Harris, supra note 26 and Reynolds, supra note 6. See also the Russian
submission to the Commission on the Continental Shelf as well as the replies of
34
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sovereignty. If tested in a court, there would be a strong evidentiary
basis had Canadian leaders enumerated each threat to which their comments referred. However, as a practical matter it must be remembered
that failure to enumerate every threat to which the comments might refer  does  not  amount  to  a  denial  of  any  speciﬁc  challenges  to  Canada’s  
Arctic sovereignty. Realistically, given the particular forum in which
the comments have been made, and the number of potential threats to
which  they  refer,  one  would  only  expect  references  to  speciﬁc  aspects  
of the dispute when Canadian leaders are in fact referring to a particular
instance of the larger sovereignty challenge.
The  question  remains  whether  a  speciﬁc  reference  to  Arctic  sovereignty may override a more general assertion of sovereignty. For example, former Prime Minister Martin’s reference to sovereignty over
Arctic land during his trip to Nunavut.37 Again the answer is no. Making  reference  to  speciﬁc  sovereignty  concerns  is  not  inconsistent  with,  
and  can  not  override,  more  general  statements.  In  deﬁning  the  Canadian  
position, the issue is not the form which assertions of sovereignty have
taken; the issue is whether sovereignty has been continuously asserted.
To divide each statement of sovereignty from the whole context of the
current sovereignty challenge and examine it in isolation is counter-productive. The important point is that each individual statement of sovereignty is not, in fact, an individual statement. Every word and act is part
of the larger framework of Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic
and, each word and act should be viewed as a part of that greater whole.
It is the cumulative effect of the statements and acts which articulate
the Canadian position; that position is that Canada has historic title to
the waters north of the Canadian mainland and that title extends to sovereignty over the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago which include the Northwest Passage.

IV. THE AMERICAN POSITION
In contrast to the general Canadian position that all the waters of the
Archipelago are internal Canadian waters, the American claim focuses
interested governments, including Canada. These documents are available at <http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_ﬁles/submission_rus.htm>.
37
Canadian Press, supra  note  28.
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speciﬁcally  on  the  waters  of  the  Northwest  Passage.  The  Americans  assert that the waters of the Northwest Passage form an international strait
and are subject to a regime of transit rights.38 Transit passage, as described in Part III of UNCLOS, means that foreign ships enjoy freedom
of  navigation  in  international  straits  subject  to  the  speciﬁc  limitations  of  
Part III.39 Those limitations, found largely in Articles 39-42, generally
require that ships conform to internationally accepted standards, and not
to any more stringent laws enacted by the coastal state.40

V. REASSESSMENT: WHY NOW?
Articulating  the  positions  of  the  parties  is,  however,  only  the  ﬁrst  and  
easiest  step.  It  is  simple  enough  for  Canadian  ofﬁcials  to  make  assertions of Arctic sovereignty generally and to state that the waters of the
Northwest  Passage  are  internal  waters  speciﬁcally,  or  for  the  Americans  
to claim that the Passage is an international strait; it is another matter to
prove that either contention is true. No state has yet found it necessary
to formally challenge the Canadian position in a court. In large part, the
lack of persistent challenge may be because the chief opponent to the
Canadian position, and the one most likely to initiate a challenge,41 is
the  United  States  and  the  1988  Executive  Agreement  mentioned  above  
(in section II. on “The Increasing Importance of the Arctic”) negates
any need for challenge. As the Agreement is without prejudice to the
position of either nation, respecting the Agreement will not harm any
future position taken, and in general only ice breakers can navigate the
Passage meaning that commercial shipping is merely a growing potential and not yet a reality, there has been no need to revisit the dispute
over the status of the Northwest Passage.42 However, with the physical
changes to the Passage and the renewed interest in using the Passage, it
is no longer clear that the dispute can remain buried.
38  
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VI. THE CANADIAN ARGUMENT: CONVENTIONAL AND
CUSTOMARY LAW
Assessing the relative strength of the Canadian and American positions
taken in the dispute over the Northwest Passage is complicated. Certainly,  as  Canada  ratiﬁed  the  United  Nations’  Convention  on  the  Law  
of the Sea in 2003, the provisions of that Convention govern Canada
on the international stage. However, customary law must also be examined when looking at the status of the Northwest Passage. This is so for
two  reasons;;  the  ﬁrst  is  that  the  provisions  of  UNCLOS  have  not  fully  
passed into customary law. As such, non-parties to UNCLOS, like the
United States, are not bound by its provisions. Secondly, UNCLOS is an
umbrella convention and its provisions are worded very generally. The
lack  of  speciﬁcity  of  some  provisions  results  in  a  continued  reliance  on  
customary law interpretations. However, as Canada is a party to UNCLOS, the treaty provisions are the logical place to begin an examination
of the validity of its position over the Northwest Passage in international
law.
The Canadian assertion of historic rights presents an immediate
problem in attempting to settle the status of the Northwest Passage under UNCLOS. Although UNCLOS refers to historic rights, the treaty
provides  no  deﬁnition.  Article  35  of  the  treaty  says  that  nothing  in  Part  
III, the part governing international straits, affects any areas of internal waters except where straight baselines have enclosed waters not
previously internal. What this means is, if Canada has historic title to
the Northwest Passage, its sovereignty over the waters is complete and
unaffected by the transit rights granted in Part III of UNCLOS. Absent   governing   deﬁnitions   in   UNCLOS,   it   is   customary   international  
law which must provide the analytical framework to Canada’s claims
to historic title.
The requirements to establish historic rights are reasonably straightforward. A state must show that it has exercised sovereignty over the
area in question for a long period of time with the acquiescence of other
states.43 However, under customary law, it also (at one time) appeared
that a state could consolidate its title to marine areas using a combina43
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tion of baselines supported by history. The result of such a consolidation
would be to make the waters internal.44 If this dual possibility, historic
title or consolidated title, did exist under customary law, there was a
possibility  that  Canada,  by  enacting  baselines  in  1986,  unquestionably  
made the waters internal before ratifying UNCLOS and so, the provisions of Part III would be inapplicable.
Based upon his assessment of the criteria for historic title, a leading
Canadian expert, Donat Pharand, concluded that the Canadian claim to
historic title was problematic.45 Rob Huebert, another Canadian expert
on Arctic matters, is even less convinced by Canada’s claims to historic
title than Pharand. Five years ago, Huebert asserted that, “[w]e know
darn well the internal-water argument doesn’t hold.”46 He reiterated this
position in a 2001 article, this time relying on Pharand’s assertion that
the historic waters argument is weak.47
However, contrary to the pessimistic position of Huebert, Pharand
concluded that under customary law, the option of consolidating title to a
marine area by using history to support the positioning of baselines was
available.48 On his reading of customary law, Pharand determined that
such a consolidation would result in the waters becoming internal with
no right of passage.49 Based upon his examination of Canada’s history,
the position of the Arctic baselines and his understanding of customary
international law, Pharand determined that Canada’s Arctic baselines
were valid and that the waters of the Canadian Arctic archipelago were
made  internal  in  1986.50 Contrary to his assessment of customary law,
Pharand did admit that under the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
UNCLOS, it was possible that such a consolidation of title might result
in waters having the associated rights only of territorial waters.51 As
44
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Canada, at a minimum, consolidated title under customary law, the waters were made internal. Had it been done under UNCLOS, Canada may
have been limited to the claim that the waters were subject to the same
rules which govern territorial waters.
However, Pharand’s position is problematic, as is the fact that some
have relied on his conclusions. For instance, the legal position of Canada has changed since Pharand’s assessment. Canada, as a party to UNCLOS, is now only able to assert rules of customary law, upon which Pharand’s  analysis  is  built,  against  non-party  states.  As  against  the  148  other  
parties to UNCLOS, Canada is bound by the provisions of that treaty.
Further,  as  Canada  had  signed  the  treaty  in  1982,  it  is  unclear  whether  
the baseline legislation that Canada enacted could have resulted in a
legal position inconsistent with what is permissible under UNCLOS.52
More problematic is that Pharand’s argument—that waters subject to
consolidation of title, based on baselines and history, are internal—has
not been accepted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a correct
statement of customary international law.
Pharand submitted that the majority of the Court was incorrect in
not holding that historic title and consolidation of title both have the
result of making waters internal in the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf
Case.53 Given the disagreement between the Arctic expert and the World
Court, the question must be asked: which is the more correct statement
of international law?

VII. CUSTOMARY LAW & CANADA:
WHO TO FOLLOW?
The special expertise of academic writers in international law, such as
Pharand, has been recognized in the Statute of the International Court
of Justice,54 which permits the Court to consult the teachings of highly
qualiﬁed  publicists  as  a  subsidiary  means  for  determining  the  rules  of  international  law.  As  such,  there  is  some  reason  to  give  signiﬁcant  weight  
52
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to Pharand’s conclusions. His conclusions are also appealing from the
point of view of one arguing for Canadian sovereignty. This is because
his conclusions support Canada’s assertion that the waters of the Archipelago are internal. However, there exists greater reason to favour
the statements of the International Court of Justice, when attempting to
determine applicable customary international law.
To   begin   with,  Article   38(1)(d)   of   the   Statute of the International
Court of Justice states that academic writers may be consulted by the
Court in order that the Court be able to determine the rules of International Law. Thus, the article which recognizes the expertise of academics  still  gives  preference  to  the  Court  as  the  ﬁnal  arbiter  of  the  content  of  
the rules of international law. Further, as the Statute of the International
Court of Justice sets out;
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
c) The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.

Based  upon  Article  38,  it  is  clear  that  the  role  of  the  ICJ  is  to  declare  
the content of customary law based upon evidence presented by parties,
not to formulate the content of customary international law. Granted
that  the  distinction  between  declaration  and  formulation  is  difﬁcult  and,  
and that the ICJ’s decisions are only binding between the parties and in
respect of that particular case;55 the provisions must give a strong reason
to take dicta of the ICJ as persuasive evidence of the content of customary international law.
Another major rationale for giving effect to the opinions of the ICJ
is that the Court is the principle judicial organ of the United Nations,56
which now has 191 members, all of whom are parties to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice.57 The broad membership of the UN,
and by extension the Court, confers upon its chief judicial organ a cer55
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tain inherent legitimacy. In addition to this inherent legitimacy, the ICJ
is composed of legal experts. Members of the court must be persons
who  are  possessed  of  the  qualiﬁcations  necessary  to  achieve  judicial  ofﬁce  in  their  home  state  or  have  recognized  competence  in  international  
law.58 Finally, decisions of the ICJ are made after full submissions and
argument by parties to a dispute, after the collection of evidence and,
if necessary, with the assistance of experts.59 This procedure provides
a broad range of sources from which the content of customary international  law  may  be  determined.  Perhaps  most  signiﬁcantly,  customary  international law is derived from state practice, and it is state parties who
present evidence to the Court. As a result of this, the Court is in a unique
position to be able to examine and make authoritative pronouncements
upon the content of customary international law. As such, there exists
strong incentive to ask what the ICJ has said is required to prove historic
title and what the result of a consolidation of title by the use of baselines
might be. If the opinions of the Court contradict the views of a particular
expert,  there  is  cause  to  tailor  legal  arguments  to  ﬁt  the  opinions  of  the  
Court.
Three cases must be examined in attempting to discern the opinions
of  the  ICJ  regarding  historic  waters.  The  ﬁrst  most  detailed  examination  
was done in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. In deciding that case, the
Court made some important pronouncements on historic waters. First, it
provided  a  deﬁnition  of  historic  waters  that  states;;  
By “historic waters” are usually meant waters which are treated as
internal waters but which would not have that character were it not
for the existence of an historic title.60

The Court then asserted that a claim to historic rights was a derogation from general international law.61 As historic waters represent a departure from general rules of law, it is assumed such claims will import
a special burden of proof on the claimant.62 The Court, in its analysis,
then subsumed the discussion of historic rights into the criteria for as58  
59
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sessing the validity of baselines. It found that the history of Norway
supported the chosen baselines and that the waters enclosed by the lines
were internal.63
Following the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, the Court examined historic rights in the Continental Shelf Delimitation Between Tunisia and
Libya,64 and the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Between El Salvador
and Honduras (Nicaragua intervening).65 The cases are important, as
the majority judgements of the Court in these cases alter the law regarding historic rights and consolidation of title set out in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case.
In the Tunisia/Libya Case, a majority of the Court stated that there
was  no  single  régime  governing  a  ﬁnding  of  historic  title,  only  particular  
régimes for each recognized case of historic title66 (it was this statement
to  which  Pharand  objected  in  his  1988  treatise).67 The régimes to which
the Court referred were: a régime based upon acquisition and occupation and a régime based upon the existence of rights “ipso facto and ab
initio.”68 By this, the majority of the ICJ seems to have meant that, under
customary international law, rights over historic waters may be akin to
those which arise when waters are internal or, they may be limited to the
rights enjoyed over territorial waters.69 In spite of the criticism of Pharand and the dissents of certain members of the Court (notably Judge
Oda with whose analysis Pharand agreed)70 a majority of the Court reiterated this statement of the law regarding historic title in the 1992 El
Salvador/Honduras Case.71 Oddly, the Court in the El Salvador/Honduras Case  also  quoted  the  deﬁnition  of  historic  waters  from  the  Fisher-
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ies Jurisdiction Case,  indicating  that  the  deﬁnitional  aspect  of  that  case  
which refers to historic waters as internal remains good law.72
In spite of the position which the ICJ has articulated a question remains regarding the weight to be given to the analyses of the law governing historic waters contained in the Tunisia/Libya Case and the El
Salvador/Honduras Case. In the Tunisia/Libya Case, the court found it
unnecessary to make a determination regarding Tunisia’s claim to historic title and,73 as a result, the statements made by the majority of the
ICJ may be taken as obiter  and  dismissed  (as  Pharand  argued  in  1988).74
However, the statements were reiterated in the El Salvador/Honduras
Case. In that case, the historic status of the Bay of Fonseca was not in issue – both parties agreed it was an historic bay.75 However, the Court did
ﬁnd  it  necessary  to  undertake  an  examination  of  the  particular  régime  
which governed the Bay of Fonseca.76  As  a  part  of  the  ﬁnal  result  did  
depend upon that examination, it appears that the “particular régimes”
comments may no longer simply be dismissed as obiter and instead,
must be taken as part of the content of customary international law.
Therefore, under current customary law, if Canada can show that
the waters of the Arctic Archipelago are historical internal waters, then
Canada is entitled to treat the waters of the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage as internal. If Canada is only able to show that the waters
were made internal by a combination of baselines supported by history, then potential user states likely have a right to innocent passage.
The situation is the same under UNCLOS, i.e. if the waters were made
internal be virtue of legitimate baselines, the right of innocent passage
survives.77
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VIII. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE
CANADIAN POSITION
Assuming this is a correct statement of current international law governing historic waters, the question to be answered is whether Canada can
claim historic rights over the waters of the Arctic Archipelago in general  and  the  Northwest  Passage  in  particular.  As  noted  above,  in  1988,  
Pharand found that the answer was no. However, since that time, the
Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement have come into effect. As such, it is worth asking whether this
alters the strength of Canada’s claims. It has been noted that the ICJ has
found that the historic presence of nomadic peoples can support a state’s
claim to historic title.78 Therefore, although the Inuit are not nomadic,79
the presence of the Inuit as original peoples and their agreements with
Canada may have an impact.
To reiterate the requirements, in order to support a claim of historic
title, Canada, as the claimant state must show that it has exercised exclusive authority, for a long period of time with the acquiescence of
other states. It is suggested that in examining the factors necessary for a
ﬁnding  of  historic  title,  that  both  the  words  and  actions  of  the  claimant  
state and any opposing state are important. While it is unclear whether
actions speak louder than words (or vice versa), if the actions of a state
contradict a protest, it may be found to lessen, or overcome, the impact
of those words.
In terms of an exclusive exercise of authority over a long period
of time, Canada can show a long, but generally inconsistent history of
exercising authority.80 However, as Pharand noted, if the laws and regulations of the coastal state are never challenged, very little is required
to maintain effective and exclusive control.81 Further, in the particular
context of the Canadian Arctic, it is worth questioning how high the degree of control exercised by Canada must be. As Canada has never sug78  
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gested that it is interested in closing the waters of the Passage entirely,
and is simply concerned that users conform to Canadian-set shipping
standards,82 one would only expect the enforcement of measures which
are directed to that end.
In terms of the degree of challenge to Canadian laws, it is worth noting that there have been few challenges to Canadian sovereignty over
the Northwest Passage. In fact, there has, to date, been very little use of
the Northwest Passage at all (only ninety-nine full transits in 101 years,
thirty-eight  of  which  were  by  Canadian  ﬂagged  ships).83 Because of the
minimal use which has been made of the Northwest Passage, it is submitted that Canada had no need to initiate a constant, comprehensive
strategy to assert its sovereignty.
In the case of Canada’s Arctic, what measures were, and are being,
undertaken? From 1906-1911, Canada applied whaling legislation to
ships operating in at least part of the claimed area,84 in addition, in 1913,
a Canadian expedition was sent to patrol the waters of the Arctic in order
to explore and to enforce Canadian Customs and Fishing Regulations
against American whalers.85 After World War I ended, an annual Arctic
patrol  was  instituted  in  order  to  protect  and  afﬁrm  Canada’s  sovereignty.  
As part of this greater show of control, the RCMP was established as a
permanent presence in important areas to consolidate title over the islands and supervise adjacent waters. Canada also exercised control over
various supply missions undertaken by American ships after the Second
World War.86 More recently, Canada enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution
Protection Act (AWPPA) in 1970. The provisions of the AWPPA, which
remains in force, are applied to ships entering Arctic waters.87 NOR82  
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DREG, a reporting system, is also available to ships entering Canadian
Arctic Waters. This system is used to facilitate rescues and assistance
should either be required (the system is however voluntary).88 However, there are problems with Canada’s assertions that it has had, and
continues to have, control over the Artic. As late as 2003, Canada did
not require a ship entering Arctic waters to give ninety-six hours notice,
as was necessary for ships entering southern waters.89  This  notiﬁcation  
requirement is now in place for Arctic waters as well.90 Does this constitute  a  sufﬁcient  exercise  of  control  over  a  sufﬁciently  long  period  to  
meet  the  ﬁrst  two  of  the  criteria  for  historic  title?  Given  the  minimal  use  
of the waters and the lack of desire to exclude all foreign vessels, the
answer may very well be yes.
Pharand did identify a further factor which he believed harmed the
Canadian claim; the fact that British and Canadian explorers did not speciﬁcally  claim  the  waters  of  the  Archipelago  when  claiming  the  land.91
This failure however, may no longer be a factor. If recognition is given
to the presence of original peoples, the Canadian claim to historic title in
the Arctic is strengthened by the presence of the Inuit in the Arctic. This
is so in particular because Canada has signed land claims agreements
with both the Inuvialuit (Inuit of the Western Arctic) and the Inuit. According  to  the  terms  of  the  1984  Inuvialuit Final Agreement;
the Inuvialuit cede, release, surrender and convey all their aboriginal
claims, rights, title and interests, whatever they may be, in and to
the Northwest Territories and Yukon Territory and adjacent offshore
areas, not forming part of the Northwest Territories or Yukon
Territory, within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada.92

Similarly, in the 1993 Agreement Between the Inuit and Canada, the
Inuit;
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In  consideration  of  the  rights  and  beneﬁts  provided  to  Inuit  by  the  
Agreement, Inuit hereby:
a) Cede, release and surrender to Her Majesty The Queen in Right of
Canada, all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests, if any,
in and to lands and waters anywhere within Canada and adjacent
offshore areas within the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Canada.93

The area covered by these two agreements stretches from 141° in
the west to the eastern edges of the Arctic Islands and includes the waters of the Northwest Passage.94
As a result of these Agreements, provided the Inuit subject to these
Agreements can establish an historic presence, Canada should now be
able to assert title by cession. Did the Inuit have an historic presence
over the land and waters of the Arctic which should be recognized? The
Inuit have inhabited the Arctic regions of what is now Canada for 4,000
years. The occupation and use of the land by the Inuit covered an area
ranging from the Mackenzie Delta in the west to the Labrador Coast in
the East and from the southern part of Hudson Bay to the High Arctic
Islands in the North. Further, until the signing of the land claims agreements, the Inuit had never signed any treaty ceding their land to European explorers, or earlier Canadian governments. Finally, Inuit hunting
activities were not limited to land, or ice, but included hunting on the
open water.95
Based upon these enumerated factors, added to the absence of non
Inuit in the area until the arrival of English explorers in the 16th century
it is apparent that the Inuit can prove an historic presence, which included  use  and  occupation,  of  the  area  in  question.  By  the  terms  of  the  1984  
and 1993 Agreements, whatever rights or title that presence conferred
are now vested in Canada and it falls to the Canadian state to assert and
defend, and claim, that title or those rights on the international level.
The combination of Inuit rights, now vested in Canada, and the exercise of Canadian authority over the Arctic waters (which began even
before title and rights had been ceded) strengthens the claim that Cana93
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da, by virtue of agreement with one of its founding peoples and through
the exercise of authority over the waters in dispute, has historic title to
the region. The question is; does it go far enough?
Rather than answer this question directly, it is useful to examine the
ﬁnal  requirement  for  a  ﬁnding  of  historic  title;;  the  acquiescence  of  other  
states. As both the United States and the European Union have protested
Canadian assertions of sovereignty to the Arctic,96 it might be expected
that  Canada  can  not  demonstrate  sufﬁcient  acquiescence  and  that,  therefore, the relative strength and longevity of any exercise of sovereignty
is moot. However, it must be asked whether the actions of the United
States or European Union members contradict the statements of opposition which they have made, weakening the protests. Further, it may
be useful to ask whether there are indications of acquiescence which
support Canadian assertions of sovereignty and which would give an
indication that the addition of Inuit rights to the Canadian claim make
Canada capable of supporting the argument of historic title.
Looking   ﬁrst   at  the  practice  of  the  United  States,  it  has  twice  engaged in actions that challenge Canadian claims to sovereignty over the
Northwest  Passage.  The  ﬁrst  challenge  came  in  1970  after  the  Humble  
Oil tanker, the Manhattan, traversed the Northwest Passage. The ofﬁcial  challenge  came  in  response  to  the  enactment  of  the  AWPPA  and  
the extension of Canada’s territorial sea out to 12M as a response to
the tanker’s journey.97The   second   challenge   came   in   1985,   when   the  
United States Coast Guard Ice Breaker, Polar Sea, transited the Passage
without asking Canadian permission. These two actions were based on
the United States’ government position that the waters of the Northwest
Passage were, in 1969-70 terms, high seas98 or are, in post-UNCLOS
terms, a strait used for international navigation.99
96
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However, the strength of the American position has been undermined by the actions, or inactions, which it has taken both in regard to
its challenges, and in the aftermath of those challenges. First, it is necessary to note that, although the United States did not request Canadian
permission to send the Manhattan or the Polar Sea through the Passage, in both cases, there was Canadian involvement or acquiescence in
the transits.100 While it might be suggested that such involvement was
permitted as a sop to an ally’s wounded pride, if the United States was
strongly committed to the position that the waters of the Northwest Passage are free to use by anyone, one would have expected them to settle
any hurt feelings after the fact and so avoid compromising their position
by accepting the involvement of the Canadian state. Further, after the
transits by the Manhattan and the Polar Sea, Canada took legislative
measures in response to the perceived threat to Canadian Arctic sovereignty. In response to the legislative actions of Canada, in 1970 the
enactment of the AWPPA and the extension of Canada’s territorial sea
to  12M  and  in  1985  the  establishment  of  baselines,  the  United  States  did  
virtually, nothing.
In 1970, the response of the United States to Canadian legislative
actions was a protest Note, but the Note was not followed by legal action.  This  is  of  some  signiﬁcance  as  the  reservation  with  which  Canada  
entered to the jurisdiction of the ICJ related only to the AWPPA, and not
to the extension of Canada’s territorial sea. Yet in spite of this limit on
Canada’s reservation, the United States did not follow up on its protest
by initiating a case before the ICJ.101 This lack of response was in spite
of the fact that a memo to Henry Kissinger, then holding the position of
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, stated that Canadian acts to assert sovereignty in the Arctic, “are critical for national
100
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security interests and seriously degrade the entire United States law of
the sea posture on which military mobility depends.”102
In the wake of the transit of the Polar Sea, the United States also took
action which had the potential effect of weakening its stated position.
In  1988,  the  United  States  and  Canada  signed  an  Executive  Agreement  
which provided that United States ice breakers would only transit the
Northwest Passage with Canada’s prior consent.103 It has been suggested
that the Agreement provides limited protection for Canada as it only
regulates passage by ice breakers however,104 even today, the Northwest
Passages is only navigable by ice breakers or ice strengthened ships and
so  this  restriction  is  really  just  a  reﬂection  of  functional  reality.  
By contrast, the United States concession to the consent requirement
cannot be so easily reasoned away. The United States asserted that its
ships  could  freely  transit  the  Northwest  Passage.  As  a  reﬂection  of  that,  
it sent the Polar Sea through without asking permission. Three years
later, the United States signed an Agreement which required that it seek
permission from Canada before sending its icebreakers through the Passage. It is unlikely this was done in anticipation that the United States
would be making frequent use of the Passage; between the transits of
the Manhattan and the Polar Sea, there were no American transits of the
Passage. As a result, it cannot be supposed that this was a measure designed  to  avoid  likely  future  conﬂict.  Further,  the  Agreement  was  basically a “win” for Canada. Although the Agreement states that it is without prejudice to the positions of the parties,105 it gives Canada exactly
what it sought; a requirement that the United States obtain permission
before using the Passage.106  Clause  3  of  the  Agreement  is  a  clear  reﬂection  that  the  United  States  retreated  signiﬁcantly  from  its  stated  position that the waters were an international strait, “The Government of
the United States pledges that all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within
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waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the
consent of the Government of Canada.”107
In addition to this series of actions and inactions, by the United
States in response to Canadian assertions of sovereignty, must be added the fact that, although the United States and the European Union
have protested the claims of Canadian Arctic sovereignty,108 most ships
which operate in the Arctic do so in compliance with Canadian law.109
Additionally, the United States has apparently accepted that Canadian
laws apply to American commercial vessels.110 Finally, since the end of
the Cold War, eco-tourist voyages to the Arctic have become popular
and, when such trips take place in the Canadian Arctic, it is done with
Canadian permission.111
However, this discussion represents only one third of the argument.
While it seems that there is some strength to the Canadian assertion that
the waters of the Passage are internal by virtue of historic title, it must
be considered whether there is greater validity to the American argument that the waters of the Passage form an international strait. As the
United States is not a party to UNCLOS, it seems logical to begin this
discussion with the position at customary law.

IX. THE AMERICAN ARGUMENT
The customary law governing international straits was set out by the
International Court of Justice in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case. In that
case, the ICJ determined that there was both a geographic and a functional requirement to be met in establishing that a strait is an international strait. Geographically the strait must connect one part of the high
seas with another part of the high seas.112 Functionally, which the Court
considered the less important of the two requirements, the strait must be
useful for international navigation.113 In determining utility, the Court
107
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accepted  evidence  of  high  use  (2,884  ships)  over  a  short  period  of  time  
(one  year,  nine  months)  representing  a  fair  number  of  ﬂags  (seven).114
If it is established under customary law that a strait is used for international navigation, innocent passage rights apply.115
Under UNCLOS, the geographic requirement has been extended.
A strait may be an international strait if it connects one part of the high
seas or an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) with another part of the
high seas or an EEZ.116 If this geographic requirement is met, and the
strait is used for international navigation, then parties to UNCLOS enjoy “transit rights” through the strait.117  As  there  is  no  deﬁnition  in  UNCLOS, the test for an international strait is the same as that articulated
in the Corfu Channel Case.118 The régime of transit rights created by
UNLCOS is friendlier to foreign shipping than that of innocent passage. Transit rights cannot be hampered by the coastal states, and it is
generally accepted international standards to which a ship is required to
conform, by contrast, coastal states may enact laws relating to innocent
passage in some circumstances (generally for the safety of shipping, the
security of the coastal state and environmental protection).119
In applying the above criteria to the Northwest Passage, it becomes
apparent that proving the assertion that the waters of the Northwest Passage  form  an  international  strait  is  subject  to  considerable  difﬁculties.  It  
is  generally  accepted  that  the  Northwest  Passage  satisﬁes  the  geographic requirement.120 As the ICJ characterized this geographic requirement
as the more important of the two,121 this provides a boost to claims the
Passage is an international strait. However, it seems unlikely that the
Northwest  Passage  would  meet  the  functional  deﬁnition  of  an  international strait.
While it has been suggested that the functional requirement will
be lessened when applied to the ice-choked waters of the Northwest
114
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Passage,122 there has been no suggestion that this requirement will be
removed in its entirety. A reduction in the functional requirement is supported by simple reality. Clearly, no one would require that the Passage
be navigated nearly 3,000 times over a two-year period in order to qualify as an international strait. Such a requirement would be impossible,
and it is unlikely that international law would be so restrictively applied.
What is unclear is the degree of use which might be required to meet
the functional requirement.123  In  examining  the  three  factors  identiﬁed  
by  the  ICJ  as  relevant,  number  of  ﬂags,  period  of  time,  and  actual  transits, it still seems that the Northwest Passage is unlikely to meet even a
reduced functional requirement.
It must be conceded that the ships which have made the transit represent   a   reasonably  high   number  of   ﬂags.   Indeed,  ships   carrying  seventeen  different  ﬂags  have  made  the  transit.124 However, even with this
relatively  high  number  of  ﬂags,  it  is  extremely  doubtful  that  a  Passage  
which has been transited fewer than 100 times in more than 100 years
could be characterized as a strait that is being used for international
navigation (to paraphrase the Corfu Channel Case).125 The same would
apply to an examination under UNCLOS. Although the United States
asserts that potential use of a strait may be considered in determining
whether a particular strait is international, it is generally agreed that
only actual use is relevant.126 Thus, in asking whether the Northwest
Passage is a strait used for international navigation, it is only the ninetynine transits which have so far been completed, which may form part of
the inquiry.
Finally, in assessing the overall strength of the United States position that the Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and
thus subject to transit rights, it is useful to remember that the United
States is not a party to UNCLOS. The regime of transit rights which the
United States claims as a right is a creation, entirely, of UNCLOS. As it
is not clear this regime has been accepted as forming a part of custom122
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ary international law at this time,127 even if the United States was correct
and the Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation,
they could, as non parties to the treaty, at best claim innocent passage
rights through the Passage.128

X. COMPARING THE LEGAL POSITIONS
This examination of current law and practice shows that, while the Canadian position that the waters are historical internal waters is (at best)
supportable on the basis of ceded original people’s title and (at worst)
problematic, the United States position on the subject is (at best) optimistic and (at worst) grounded in wishful thinking. Given that there are
problems with the legal positions of both parties, it is unlikely that either
the United States or Canada will choose to resort to legal process to settle this dispute.129  The  dispute  involves  very  signiﬁcant  concerns.  Each  
party has articulated a position which it considers necessary to assure its
security and neither is likely to permit a loss of control over a process
that will determine rights which will impact such vital interests. Further,
the last time the two countries resorted to international legal process (the
Gulf  of  Maine  arbitration)  neither  was  satisﬁed  with  the  outcome.130
This examination of Canadian and American assertions, set against
current legal requirements and practice, as opposed to the statements of
other nations, indicates that Pharand may have been too quick to dismiss
the possibility that Canada could prove historic title to the waters of the
Arctic. Although it is not clear that Canada could prove such title, it is
not clear that such a claim is doomed to failure from the outset. Even if
Canada is unable to support a claim to historic title, it is possible that,
at a minimum, the current situation admits that the waters of the Passage   were   made   internal   by   virtue   of   the   1985-86   baselines   and   that,  
the strength of UNCLOS Article 234 permits Canada to restrict the in127
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nocent  passage  rights  which  apply  to  user  states.  This  is  the  ﬁnal  question which must be examined when assessing the current status of the
Northwest Passage in international law.

XI. A THIRD ALTERNATIVE
Before asserting that recent practice suggests that other states are tacitly
admitting Canadian historic title, it must be pointed out that, if the baselines  established  in  1985-86  are  valid,  the  waters  of  the  Canadian  Arctic  
Archipelago are internal (although subject to rights of innocent passage). This is so by virtue of both customary law (as examined above)
and  by  virtue  of  Article  8(2)  of  UNCLOS.  Although  Canada’s  baselines  
were protested,131  subsequent  state  practice,  if  it  is  not  sufﬁcient  to  show  
acquiescence  to  historic  title,  should  be  sufﬁcient  to  overcome  the  effects of the protests to the baselines. No legal challenge has been raised
against the baselines and foreign vessels, as indicated above, generally
operate in compliance with Canadian laws.132 Further, academic commentary has suggested that, based on the factors enumerated in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case,  and  codiﬁed  in  UNCLOS  Article  7,  the  baselines  are  justiﬁable.133
A brief discussion of the factors enumerated in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case  and  in  UNCLOS  will  sufﬁce  to  assess  Canada’s  baselines.  
Essentially, baselines can be used where a coastline is deeply indented
or if there is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity. A baseline
must not depart to an appreciable extent from the direction of the coast
and  the  sea  areas  within  the  baselines  must  be  sufﬁciently  closely  linked  
to the nearby land to be subject to the regime of internal waters. In drawing the baselines, account may be taken of interests particular to the
region concerned as evidenced by long usage.134
In terms of the Canadian Arctic, the baselines which have been established around the outer edge of the Arctic islands are unquestion131

Rothwell, supra note 97 at 345.
Brubaker, supra note 43 at 279.
133
Pharand, “Canada’s Sovereignty” supra note 50 at 331, Rothwell supra note 97
at 367.
134
UNCLOS, supra note 32 art. 7, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 32 at
133,  138.
132

236 – DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

ably  justiﬁable.  In  geographic  terms,  it  is  sufﬁcient  to  point  out  that  the  
baseline regime established by Canada around the Arctic Archipelago
must conform to the legal requirements articulated by the ICJ in the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. As such, if a coast were similar to the Norwegian coast, it would be a strong indication that such a maritime area
is properly able to be enclosed by baselines. In this connexion, it is
worth noting that Judge McNair’s dissent in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case compared the Norwegian Coast to the Canadian coast.135 If the
similarity  was  sufﬁcient  to  be  apparent  to  a  member  of  the  ICJ  in  1951,  
there seems little reason to doubt that such similarity can support the
contention that the Canadian Arctic Archipelago is properly subject to a
baseline regime today.
In addition, the baselines which Canada has established can be supported by the presence of the Inuit and their particular interests. The
Inuit have for centuries developed cultural practices which range over
the area enclosed by the baselines.136 The cultural practices which they
established over that time required that they move with the seasons.137
Moreover, those cultural practices remain central to the Inuit today.138
Given the importance of the enclosed area to the Inuit, the similarity with
the Norwegian situation and the fact that, in that case, the ICJ characterized that type of offshore archipelago as constituting, “a whole with the
mainland, it is the outer line of the ‘skjaergaard’ which must be taken
into account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian territorial waters,”139
any challenge to the Canadian delimitations is very likely to meet with
failure. It is also worth considering that, if the waters of the Archipelago
were simply made internal by the establishment of the baselines, there
might be no need to insist on a formal challenge to the delimitation as,
by  virtue  of  Article  8(2)  of  UNCLOS  a  right  of  innocent  passage  would  
apply. Such rights would permit use of the Northwest Passage by foreign  ﬂagged  ships.
It is also possible that innocent passage rights in the Arctic might
not be incompatible with Canadian needs. Innocent passage rights, as
135
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detailed by UNCLOS Article 19, set limits on what a foreign vessel
is permitted to do in the waters of the coastal state. Although it does
not  speciﬁcally  require  that  a  foreign  vessel  submit  to  all  the  laws  of  
a coastal state, it may be that in ice covered waters, innocent passage
rights  are  modiﬁed  by  the  impact  of  Article  234  (the  so-called  Canadian  
clause).  It  has  been  suggested  that,  even  absent  ratiﬁcation  of  UNCLOS  
by  Canada,  the  country  was  able  to  beneﬁt  from  the  effects  of  Article  
234  as  it  was  a  generally  accepted  provision  even  absent  ratiﬁcation.140
As such, it is possible that the acquiescence of other states to Canadian
laws is based, not on the strength of Canada’s historic title, but because
Canada, by customary and conventional international law, is permitted to enact more stringent pollution prevention measures in its arctic
waters, restricting the rights of innocent passage which user states otherwise enjoy.141
Canada has asserted that the waters are historical internal waters
because such a position was deemed necessary to protect Canadian sovereignty and security. However, it has never been the Canadian position
that they would not permit use of the Arctic waters by foreign ships.142
If the impact of the Canadian clause is such that innocent passage in ice
covered areas requires compliance with stringent environmental laws
(as opposed to “normal” rights of innocent passage which only require
abstention from acts of wilful or serious pollution)143 it is submitted that
such a situation would be compatible with Canadian needs. Inspections
to ensure compliance with environmental laws added to the requirements for passage to be innocent (found in UNCLOS Article 19) would
adequately protect both the Arctic environment and Canadian sovereignty. Therefore, it is possible that state practice is leading to a situ140
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ation in which one article of UNCLOS, Article 234, is being read as
modifying other provisions of the treaty, tipping the balance of rights,
in this case, in favour of the coastal states. Indeed, this suggestion is
compatible with the theory that state practice in the Arctic was already
resulting in the development of a circumpolar customary law outside of
UNCLOS.144

XII. THE STATUS QUO:
SHOULD WE MAKE A CHANGE?
The only remaining question is whether a negotiated settlement is preferable to letting a modus vivendi develop. Canada may want to examine
the possibility of renegotiating the Agreement with the United States
over the Passage. Now that it is possible for ice strengthened ships,
rather than only ice breakers, to navigate the Passage, the current Agreement may no longer give adequate protection to Canadian interests. The
likelihood of any renegotiation, when assessed in light of current conditions, is however, minimal. It has been suggested recently that comments by the former United States Ambassador to Canada, Paul Celluci,
should be taken as an invitation to negotiate. Celluci, before leaving
Canada, indicated that the United States is currently looking at everything through the terrorism prism and, as such, might be willing to
make concessions on the Northwest Passage if it is in the United States’
security interests.145
Practically, such concessions are unlikely to materialize. It was argued during the Cold War that an admission that the Northwest Passage  is  internal  Canadian  waters  would  beneﬁt  United  States  security  
by permitting the regulation, or exclusion, of Soviet ships from the Passage. This was not a strong enough argument to sway the United States
in  1970  or  1985;;  American  leaders  considered  it  more  important  to  be  
able to freely navigate their own ships than to restrict the navigational
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rights of Soviet ships in one area.146 Similarly, if the United States today considers that its interests are best served by maintaining a position
consistent with free navigation, they are unlikely to concede Canadian
sovereignty and control over the Passage. Therefore; a legal resolution
is unlikely as neither party will want to lose control of the process and, a
bilateral agreement is unlikely as only one party, Canada, currently has
a reason to upset the status quo.147

CONCLUSION
The question of the status of the Northwest Passage has garnered increasing attention by academics, and Canadian leaders have made statements asserting Canadian Arctic sovereignty generally. However, the
reality  may  be  that  Canada’s  position  will  strengthen  if  it  delays  a  ﬁnal  
determination the status of the Passage. Although it is in Canada’s interest  to  alter  the  current  status  quo  with  regard  to  the  1988  Agreement  with  
the United States, it is not in Canada’s interest to do anything would will
upset the general compliance with its laws which it currently enjoys.
Regardless of the reasons for compliance, the effect is for Canada to
secure the control it desires. The longer the compliance continues, the
more likely it becomes that compliance will be recognized as an obligation imposed by customary law. Canada should attempt to characterize  derogations  from  compliance  as  unjustiﬁable  breaches  of  customary  
law.    In  the  case  of  Canadian  allies,  like  the  United  States,  justiﬁcation  
of such a breach could not even be based upon necessity, as Canada is
unlikely to refuse passage to allied nations, especially in a situation of
emergency.
Given that time and the continuation of current practice can only
strengthen Canada’s position, one can expect that while Canadian leaders will continue to assert Arctic sovereignty and continue to take reasonable unilateral measures to secure that sovereignty on a domestic
level, they will do nothing to cause a reaction on the international level.
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Huebert, “The Shipping News Part II” supra note 10 at 305.
Elliot-Meisel, supra note 104 at 421. Elliot-Meisel suggests that, while Canada
arguably has a stronger incentive to settle the dispute, a resolution is also in the
interests of the US. For an argument that Canada is likely to maintain the status quo,
see Charron, supra note 129 at 25.
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Although certainty regarding the status of the Passage might be desirable, it is not yet an urgent issue urgency, such that should Canada risk
spoiling the peaceful compliance it currently enjoys.

